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Abstract
What explains the evolution of negotiations on liberalising environmentally friendly goods and services
over the past 15 years and the EU’s position on these? In December 2016 negotiators did not succeed
in their goal of concluding an Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) in Geneva. This was considered
by many participants and observers as a missed opportunity for a win-win for the global economy
and the environment. Protectionist wrangling over which products should be on a list for speedy
liberalisation was seen as the main reason why the negotiations (temporarily) failed. However, we show
that the environmental objectives of these negotiations had already gradually been pushed to the back
by commercial objectives. While there had been attempts in early phases of the negotiations to make
the environmental effects of goods primordial, in the end a commercial logic prevailed. We point
to the importance of the paradigm of ‘liberal environmentalism’, which makes it difficult to promote
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trade-conditioning measures in an already commercially biased policy subsystem. We focus particularly
on the EU as one of the key actors in the EGA negotiations. Through a number of interviews with
European policy-makers and civil society representatives, and desk research of negotiating documents
and secondary literature, we find evidence of the prevalence of liberal environmentalist thinking, the
dominance of trade actors in the policy subsystem and difficulties for environmental actors to penetrate
these negotiations. We conclude that trying to reconcile trade and environmental objectives in a
synergetic (‘win-win’) manner does not make a successful conclusion necessarily easier.
Keywords: EU trade policy; Environmental Goods Agreement; liberal environmentalism; climate action
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1. Introduction
In the past 25 years, the international trade agenda has evolved remarkably. The conclusion of
the Uruguay Round (1986–94) of global trade negotiations further reduced traditional quantitative trade
barriers (tariffs and quota), making them less significant, and brought new issues such as services and
intellectual property rights into the remit of the newly established World Trade Organization (WTO).
Following the contentious Tuna-Dolphin dispute under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in
1991 and the supplementary pacts to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on labour (the
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation) and the environment (the North American Agreement
on Environmental Cooperation) negotiated in 1993, the environment became one of the key ‘non-trade
concerns’ on the international trade agenda. Subsequently, the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the
WTO referred in its preamble to sustainable development as one of the objectives of the international trade
regime. This evolution of the trade agenda increasingly affected the politics of trade. New objectives,
actors and norms have penetrated and thereby changed trade politics.
Since then, academic work on ‘trade and . . . ’ issues has proliferated. This expanding literature
has been diverse both in terms of disciplinary perspectives and the types of ‘non-trade issues’ that have
been studied. Legal scholars have mainly analysed the compatibility of using trade policy for non-trade
concerns with WTO rules.1 Economists have primarily tried to calculate the (positive, negative or neutral)
effects of trade liberalisation on non-trade objectives, and vice versa.2 Political scientists have mostly
tried to describe how the proliferation of non-trade issues changes the politics of trade policy.3 All of
these groups of academics have focused on environmental, social and foreign policy issues, among others.
In this article, we look at the politics of one particular entity, namely the European Union (EU),
with regard to one particular non-trade objective: climate protection. We analyse the issue mainly from a
political science perspective. The EU is an important actor in ‘trade and . . . ’ politics. Arguably, it used
access to its market very early on to pursue non-trade goals, such as the development of – and upholding a
special relationship with – the former colonies of its Member States. Shortly after the establishment of
NAFTA and the WTO, the EU also adapted its Generalised System of Preferences in order to convince
developing countries to respect international labour and environmental norms in return for better access to
the EU market (so-called ‘GSP plus’). The EU has been seen as the main driver of a new multilateral
trade round, with a specific focus on development (the ‘Doha Development Round’) and environmental
protection as one of the objectives (see below).
More specifically, we will analyse the EU’s role in the negotiations on an Environmental Goods
Agreement (EGA) that has its roots in this Doha Development Agenda. In recent years, this agreement
has been identified by policy-makers as the key contribution that the international trading system could
make to mitigate climate change, and as a prime example that trade liberalisation and climate protection
can go hand in hand. Nonetheless, these negotiations failed in late 2016. In this article, we discuss the
evolution of these negotiations, with a specific focus on the role of the EU, in order to understand why
they have not come to a successful conclusion. In doing so, we point at the importance of a particular
way of thinking about desirable policies in the trade–climate nexus that pushed negotiations in a certain
‘synergetic’ direction, but apparently without necessarily making finding consensus easier.
The next section will discuss why we should adapt our traditional political science models to
explain trade policy decisions that involve non-trade objectives. We argue that in ‘nexus politics’
paradigms that offer a particular understanding of how policy areas interact, and what the problems
to be addressed and desirable solutions are, should be of central importance to our explanations. Here, we
1E.g. Robert Howse, ‘The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and
Environment Debate’ (2002) 27 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 491; Olivier De Schutter, Trade in the Service of
Sustainable Development: Linking Trade to Labour Rights and Environmental Standards (Hart Publishing 2015).
2E.g. Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘Trade Liberalisation and “Fair Trade” Demands: Addressing the Environmental and Labour
Standards Issues’ (1995) 18 The World Economy 745; Matthew A. Cole, ‘Trade, the Pollution Haven Hypothesis and the
Environmental Kuznets Curve: Examining the Linkages’ (2004) 48 Ecological Economics 71.
3E.g. Alasdair Young and John Peterson, ‘The EU and the New Trade Politics’ (2006) 13 JEPP 795. On how the SPS and
TBT agreements affect regulatory politics, see Ferdi De Ville, ‘European Union Regulatory Politics in the Shadow of the WTO:
WTO Rules as Frame of Reference and Rhetorical Device’ (2012) 19 Journal of European Public Policy 700.
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also extensively introduce the ‘liberal environmentalism’ paradigm that has become central in thinking
about the trade–climate nexus. The third section offers our empirical analysis of the EGA negotiations,
and the role of the EU in particular. In the final section, we summarise our findings and discuss their
relevance for policies and analyses in the trade–climate nexus.
2. Politics in the trade–climate nexus: a focus on the ‘liberal environmentalism’ paradigm
With the emergence of a ‘new trade agenda’, political scientists are also confronted with the question
of whether they should adapt their explanatory models to understand and explain (EU) trade policy.
Influenced by political economy analyses of US trade policies, accounts that focus on producer groups
have until now been prevalent as other groups in society, such as consumers or environmentalists, are
supposed to be too diffuse to organise themselves for mobilisation. In such ‘interest group’ accounts, trade
policy is supposed to be the outcome of a societal conflict between exporters (promoting liberalisation
to gain access to new markets) and import-competing firms (advocating protectionism to avoid loss of
domestic market shares), leading governments to adopt certain (more or less liberal or protectionist)
positions.4 In the EU’s peculiar institutional architecture, this liberal, interest group-oriented model has
been complemented by an institutionalist ‘principal-agent approach’ focused on the dynamics between
Member States (which take joint positions on trade policy in the Council of the European Union) as
principals and the European Commission (which is the sole negotiator for the EU in trade policy) as the
agent.5 In that way, the ‘EU trade politics’ literature has developed a model linking societal actors through
EU-specific decision-making processes to trade policy outcomes. Norms and ideas have been less central
to the political science literature on EU trade policy, except for some constructivist analyses that highlight
the neoliberal consensus underpinning the policy domain.6
Can this model, originally developed in the US to explain ‘traditional’ trade policy (i.e. focused on
removing quantitative restrictions) simply be transposed to the new trade agenda with the inclusion of
non-trade objectives? The answer could be positive if we would see these non-trade objectives as just
another form of non-tariff protectionism over which exporting and import-competing firms will collide as
they do over tariffs or quota. But there are good theoretical and empirical reasons not to do so. Non-trade
objectives can be assumed to bring new actors and non-commercial objectives and norms to the trade
arena, changing the politics of trade agreements, as recently shown in the politicised EU-US Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA) negotiations.7 Trade politics can no longer be considered the exclusive terrain of trade officials
and producer groups. In the ‘new trade politics’, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and political
actors promoting non-trade causes can be assumed to enter the trade arena. Their interest in this domain
can be awakened by the (perceived) negative consequences of trade flows or policies. Such an initial
defensive response could, after they have gained expertise in the subject matter, evolve into offensive
claims to use trade policy to promote non-trade objectives. NGOs and political non-trade actors can hence
become influential actors in trade politics by providing expertise, diffuse norms or conditional legitimacy
to governments or opposition parties.
To understand this change to twenty-first-century trade politics, we propose a ‘discursive
institutionalist’ perspective8 and will apply it to the trade–climate nexus. This approach assumes that
interests are always mediated by ideas and institutions. The objectives that actors pursue and their beliefs
4E.g. Andreas Dür, ‘Bringing Economic Interests Back into the Study of EU Trade Policy-Making’ (2008) 10 British Journal
of Politics & International Relations 27.
5E.g. Andreas Dür and Manfred Elsig, ‘Principals, Agents, and the European Union’s Foreign Economic Policies’ (2011) 18
Journal of European Public Policy 323.
6E.g. Gabriel Siles-Brügge, ‘The Power of Economic Ideas: A Constructivist Political Economy of EU Trade Policy’ (2013)
9 Journal of Contemporary European Research 598; Ferdi De Ville and Jan Orbie, ‘The European Commission’s Neoliberal
Trade Discourse Since the Crisis: Legitimizing Continuity through Subtle Discursive Change’ (2014) 16 British Journal of
Politics & International Relations 149.
7Ferdi De Ville and Gabriel Siles-Brügge, ‘Why TTIP is a Game-Changer and Its Critics Have a Point’ (2016) 24 Journal of
European Public Policy 1491; Alasdair R. Young, The New Politics of Trade: Lessons from TTIP (Agenda Publishing 2017).
8Vivien A. Schmidt, ‘Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse’ (2008) 11 Annual Review
of Political Science 303.
Europe and the World: A law review 2-1 4
about how these objectives can be achieved depend on the ideas they hold, which are seen not as static
but as dynamically amendable through discursive intercourse. Institutions, finally, not only influence
which actors have standing over certain decisions and the rules of the game for taking decisions, but
also provide ‘meaning contexts’ in which certain ideas are more acceptable than others. We argue that
paradigms are particularly important in ‘nexus politics’. Here, actors from different backgrounds, with
diverging goals and ideas about how to realise these, come together to find joint solutions. A paradigm
that offers a particular view on how different policy areas interact, if accepted by policy-makers, can help
overcome differences. While paradigms have inclusionary effects in aligning actors around a common
problem definition, they also have exclusionary consequences in making certain policy understandings
and solutions unthinkable. Finally, the ‘forum’ in which nexus politics is executed will also affect who
gets access to decisions and which paradigms, or decision-making ‘logics’, prevail.
Based on the work of Steven Bernstein, we argue that in recent decades policy-makers in the
trade–climate nexus have converged around a certain ‘liberal environmentalist’ understanding of this
nexus, and that this has very much influenced the evolution of the EGA negotiations. We will introduce
this paradigm extensively below. While his analysis focused on negotiations in the ‘economy–ecology’
nexus held within international environmental policy forums, we will argue that the fact that the EGA
negotiations took place within the WTO served to reinforce the liberal leg of this paradigm. Bernstein has
analysed how the thinking on the economy–ecology nexus has evolved over the past 50 years. He has come
to the conclusion that over time, a paradigm of ‘liberal environmentalism’ has become dominant. This can
be defined as a paradigm that believes in the possibilities of compromises between environmental and
economic objectives, by drawing on economic solutions that fit the existing economic structures to address
environmental problems.9 In the case of international environmental negotiations, his influential analysis
shows that the dominant paradigms on the relationship between the global economy, development and
the environment have shifted from ‘environmental protection’ (in the 1970s) over ‘managed sustainable
growth’ (in the 1980s) to ‘liberal environmentalism’ (increasingly dominant since the 1990s).
This shift is of an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary nature. Elements of ‘liberal
environmentalism’ were already present in ‘environmental protection’, which is the first norm complex
Bernstein identifies based on the analysis of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
(UNCHE) in Stockholm in 1972. The Stockholm conference’s recommendations already stated
that environmental policies should not hamper development. However, there was a consensus that
environmental protection requires substantial transfers of financial aid, technology, and scientific
information to developing countries.10 Contrary to the Declaration’s principles, a follow-up study
on the implementation of Stockholm stated that developing countries did not receive significant additional
financial resources to help them deal with environmental problems. This reinforced their perception
of the economy–ecology–development relationship as a choice between environmental protection and
economic growth.11 During this episode, command-and-control methods of environmental protection
were favoured over market allocation. However, soon after Stockholm, the North started focusing on
methods of internalising environmental costs with minimum disruption to markets, while the South still
sought a reform of the international economic system, which it felt relied too heavily on the market to
the detriment of the poor.12 In the North, increased attention to environmental concerns led to increased
efforts to find a fit between liberal economic norms and environmental protection. As early as 1972, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) had developed the ‘polluter pays
principle’ (PPP) as a means to avoid environmental regulations that would interfere with free market
9Steven Bernstein, The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism (Colombia University Press 2001).
10UNCHE Declaration principles 9 and 20: scientific research and development in the context of environmental problems,
both national and multinational, must be promoted in all countries, especially the developing countries. In this connection, the
free flow of up-to-date scientific information and transfer of experience must be supported and assisted, to facilitate the solution
of environmental problems; environmental technologies should be made available to developing countries on terms which would
encourage their wide dissemination without constituting an economic burden on the developing countries.
11Bernstein (n 9) 43–9.
12Bernstein (n 9) 50.
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mechanisms.13 This started a trend to incorporate environmental costs rather than to regulate14 (via
command-and-control measures) to counter environmental degradation.15 The EU picked up the principle
in its first Environmental Action Plan (1973–6), and since 1987 it has also been enshrined in its Treaties.
Overall, the Stockholm conference lacked a unifying theme to forge consensus between North
and South. The introduction of ‘sustainable development’ in the subsequent decade brought about a
solution to this problem. The ‘emptiness’ of the concept16 and the vagueness it casts upon the respective
responsibilities of actors involved allowed it to gain widespread support.17 It was able to build a bridge
between the two camps that had emerged,18 with the North aiming for pollution abatement and the
South being concerned about development and distributional justice. In 1987 the World Commission
on Environment and Development (WCED) published the ‘Brundlandt Report’. Here, ‘sustainable
development’ was defined in terms of ‘managed sustainable growth’.19 Traditional Keynesian recipes
were now infused with environmental considerations. More precisely, domestic economic policies, as well
as the policies of international economic organisations, were expected to take environmental concerns
into account. This was not supposed to mean a halt to growth or to the expansion of international trade,
but selective interventions were to be allowed both to protect the environment and to help developing
countries benefit more from the liberal economic order. This norm complex, a liberal-Keynesian definition
of sustainable development, hence promoted managed free trade and international and domestic policies
to help developing countries grow in an environmentally friendly way, inter alia through international
financial assistance and the easing of property rights to facilitate technology transfer. In this way,
Brundlandt provided a transition from Stockholm to Rio (which would promote a more neoliberal
definition of sustainable development). It made clear that environmental and developmental goals could
rest on the same normative foundation of economic growth and established common responsibilities of
the North and the South in furthering ‘managed sustainable growth’ through sound management and
assistance from the North and domestic reform in the South.
Eventually, the ambiguous concept of sustainable development would be filled in a more neoliberal
way at the ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio in 1992, with what Bernstein calls the ‘liberal environmentalism’
paradigm or norm complex.20 The Earth Summit came right at the time when the Washington Consensus
had risen to prominence in the most important international organisations. Even the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) had begun to recognise the value of domestic
macroeconomic, trade and investment policies along Washington Consensus lines. At Rio, ‘[n]ot only
was the compatibility of growth and environmental protection cemented in international discourse, but
economic instruments and market-based solutions were already perceived to be the mechanisms best able
to achieve this synthesis’.21 No longer were managed trade, technology transfer, and assistance seen as
ways to reconcile development with environmental protection. From here onwards, unconstrained free
markets in and of themselves were seen as the solution. In consequence, the burden would be shifted more
towards developing countries, which had to pursue export-led growth through domestic liberalisation,
which would lead not only to income growth, but also to more environmentally friendly development.
13As the main function of PPP the OECD recommendation specifies: ‘The allocation of costs of pollution prevention and
control measures to encourage rational use of scarce environmental resources and to avoid distortions in international trade and
investment. The polluter should bear the expense of carrying out the measures decided by public authorities to ensure that the
environment is in an acceptable state’ OECD 1972, emphases added.
14Admittedly, PPP in practice often took the form of direct regulations based on standards, permits and so on, which impose
costs of meeting those standards on the polluter. Even in such cases, however, PPP relies on proper pricing (Bernstein (n 9) 51).
See also EU Commission interpretation (2012): ‘Market based instruments are well suited to improve internalization of
environmental costs, but command and control law is still of high relevance in particular to implement the preventive aspects
of PPP.’
15Bernstein (n 9) 50–1.
16see e.g. Susan, Baker, ‘Sustainable Development as Symbolic Commitment: Declaratory Politics and the Seductive Appeal
of Ecological Modernisation in the European Union’ (2007) 16(2) Environmental Politics 297–317.
17Bernstein (n 9) 50.
18Bernstein (n 9) 50.
19Bernstein (n 9) 66.
20Bernstein (n 9) 70.
21Bernstein (n 9) 73.
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In the Rio Declaration, the right to development is recognised together with the prohibition on using
environmental measures in a way that unjustifiably restricts trade (thereby adopting a principle from
the international trade system). No longer are selective interventions invoked to reconcile trade and the
environment, nor is technology transfer through financial assistance and the easing of property rights seen
as necessary. Instead, it is assumed that market mechanisms will deliver technology transfer.
To sum up, the most important changes between the prevailing paradigms in international
environmental negotiations are: where initially, it was recognised that developed and developing countries
differed in terms of responsibilities, sources and solutions to environmental problems, eventually this
was formulated as ‘common but differentiated responsibility’; where first command-and-control-like
interventions in the international economy were seen as necessary, finally free trade and environmental
protection were seen not only as compatible, but even as synergetic, with the former automatically leading
to the latter; and finally, whereas earlier it was thought that environmental protection requires substantial
technology transfer and financial assistance towards developing countries, eventually it was argued that
technology transfer could best be left to market mechanisms.
Others, like Zelli, Gupta and Van Asselt,22 have also recognised the importance of this paradigm
in the trade–environment nexus. In the case of climate change, they characterise this market-friendly
approach with a focus on efficiency gains from technological innovation, the diffusion of climate-friendly
goods through trade, and the promotion of emissions trading over traditional regulation. This view on the
trade–environment nexus thus claims synergistic aspects among trade and environment, while sidelining
conflicting ones. Policy-wise this is reflected not only in the rejection of certain regulatory proposals (such
as in the case of the US and developing countries, largely pushing for more market-liberal approaches), but
also in a process of self-censorship (such as in the case of the EU, failing to establish more trade-restrictive
climate protection measures such as border tax adjustments).
Critics point to the implicit consequences of the focus on win-win scenarios in trade–climate
interactions. In the context of sustainability initiatives in agricultural trade governance, Jennifer Clapp
draws attention to the fact that the norm of trade liberalisation ultimately shapes sustainability initiatives
and thereby constrains their transformative potential. The dominant narrative within the trade sphere
prescribes liberalisation as the necessary policy response to achieve more sustainable outcomes, to the
detriment of a more integrated system overhaul.23 On this note, Lucy Ford highlights that while EU trade
policy is now addressing sustainability questions, contradictions between current economic growth and
sustainability challenges are muted.24 Another branch of literature critiques the lack of meaning attached
to sustainability initiatives. Methmann has criticised ‘climate protection’ as an empty signifier. While put
forward as an important policy goal, existing activities are rephrased in terms of climate protection rather
than changed.25
In the next section, we trace the impact of liberal environmentalism in the negotiations on liberalising
environmentally friendly goods, and particularly how they have informed the EU’s role.
3. The EU’s role in the Environmental Goods Agreement negotiations
3.1. A brief history of EGA
The 2001 Doha Development Agenda mandate called for ‘the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination
of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services’.26 While the negotiations on
22Zelli Fariborz, Aarti Gupta and Harro Van Asselt, ‘Institutional Interactions at the Crossroads of Trade and Environment:
The Dominance of Liberal Environmentalism?’ (2013) 19 Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International
Organizations 105.
23Jennifer Clapp, ‘Trade and the Sustainability Challenge for Global Food Governance’ (2016) International Studies
Association Annual Meetings in Atlanta, GA. March.
24Lucy Ford, ‘EU Trade Governance and Policy: A Critical Perspective’ (2013) 9(4) Journal of Contemporary European
Research 578–96.
25Chris Paul Methmann, ‘“Climate Protection” as Empty Signifier: A Discourse Theoretical Perspective on Climate
Mainstreaming in World Politics’ (2010) 39(2) Millennium 345–372.
26World Trade Organization, ‘Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration’ (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 of 20 November 2001)
paragraph 31 iii.
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environmental goods and services were expected to be a likely candidate for early conclusion, these
expectations failed to materialise. Both in terms of conceptualisation and interests at stake, this area
proved to be more contentious than initially anticipated. The Committee on Trade and Environment in
Special Session (CTESS) was mandated to clarify the concept of environmental goods, which turned out
to be a rather difficult task. Talks quickly became bogged down in attempts to decide on the approach that
would guide the liberalisation of environmental goods. Several formats have been proposed: the ‘criterion
approach’ involved developing criteria or a definition of environmental goods; the ‘project approach’
proposed eliminating tariffs on products used in environmental projects; the ‘list approach’ simply put
forward a list of proposed environmental goods, grouped under categories previously suggested by the
OECD and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).27 Against this stalemate at the WTO, in
September 2012 APEC members put forward a product list based on individual nominations for which
they would lower tariff rates to 5 per cent or less by the end of 2015. The initiative was inspired by the
plurilateral, sectoral liberalisation format of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA). The political
commitment voiced by APEC leaders could not be considered ambitious as they only addressed tariffs
(hence leaving out non-tariff barriers and services, as was envisioned before) that, in addition, were already
low.28 Moreover, the list was limited to only those specific goods that could be readily distinguished
by customs agents and focused on the end use of products. Issues related to ‘like products’, products
defined by particular process or production methods (PPMs) or life-cycle impacts, were not addressed.
Efforts to define or evaluate environmental goods on the basis of environmental criteria were put aside.
Focusing on these issues would have involved a more ecologically centred approach, which requires
the development of a definition of what exactly ‘environmentally friendly’ entails, and a methodology
based on environmental impact. The list approach that was eventually chosen essentially leaves the
selection of goods to commercial negotiation dynamics familiar to trade negotiators. In its turn, the APEC
agreement laid the foundation for the EGA negotiations, which would take the form of a stand-alone
plurilateral agreement, after the failure of the multilateral, ‘single undertaking’ Doha Round. In July
2014 the EU, together with 13 other WTO members,29 launched negotiations on the EGA. Building
on the APEC initiative, the first stage of the talks would focus on removing tariffs on a broad list of
environmental goods. As was the case for the APEC list, average applied most-favoured nation (MFN)
tariffs for proposed goods were already very low. In part, this is due to the political economy of tariff
submissions in trade negotiations: countries always avoid putting up products on which they have tariff
peaks, concentrating instead on goods in which they have a comparative advantage.30 In December 2016
negotiations collapsed, as parties failed to reach a consensus on a product list. One of the emblematic
issues was the ‘bicycle debacle’: China insisted on including bicycles on the product list in the EGA
negotiations, which was considered as a red line by the EU.31 The EGA conclusion was scheduled
before the end of the Obama administration, a deadline that only gained in importance after the 2016 US
presidential election result. Timelines had been shifting as parties could not agree on a compromise that
encompassed their commercial interests sufficiently. In the final days of the negotiations China came
up with a revised product list, which was interpreted by a Directorate General (DG) Trade official as
‘an elegant way to stop the process, but appear to be proactive’.32 Ironically, the ‘pragmatic’ decision
27‘India’s Project Approach Causes Stir at Environmental Goods Talks’ (Biores, 24 June 2004) <https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-
news/biores/news/indias-project-approach-causes-stir-at-environmental-goods-talks> accessed 19 October 2017.
28Only 20 per cent of tariff lines were above 5 per cent and the average applied tariffs across members was less than 3 per cent.
See Jaime De Melo, ‘How Much Will the Davos Initiative Help Reduce Trade Barriers in “Green Goods?”’ (2014) 3(4) The
Brookings Institution 1 <www.brookings.edu/opinions/how-much-will-the-davos-initiative-help-reduce-trade-barriers-in-green-
goods/> accessed 4 February 2019.
29Original parties to the negotiations were Australia, Canada, China, Costa Rica, the European Union, Hong Kong (China),
Japan, Korea, Norway, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei and the United States. Since then, Iceland, Israel
and Turkey have also become parties to the negotiations.
30De Melo (n 28) 1–3.
31Bicycles currently face a 14 per cent tariff rate at the EU border. See Iana Dreyer, ‘Environmental Goods Agreement –
Why Talks Faltered’ (Borderlex, 6 December 2016) <http://www.borderlex.eu/environmental-goods-agreement-talks-faltered/>
accessed 19 October 2017.
32Interview DG Trade, Brussels, 16 December 2016.
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to refrain from trying to define what ‘environmentally friendly’ means resulted in highly politicised
negotiations, with political wrangling over rival commercial interests taking the upper hand. In sum,
the level of ambition has narrowed down significantly since the Doha Ministerial Declaration more than
15 years ago. The multilateral comprehensive initiative stalled and negotiations resumed in a plurilateral
configuration focused on tariff reduction only. The list approach, with implicit focus on the end use of
products, has put aside efforts to define or evaluate environmental goods on the basis of environmental
(rather than commercial) criteria. In addition to that, a range of issues have either moved to the margins of
the agenda or disappeared from it altogether. Some of these items were demands made by the EU and other
industrialised countries (such as the inclusion of environmental services and Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs));
others (such as technology transfer and capacity-building) were demands voiced by developing countries.
The EU has been pushing to include both services and NTBs, but was only able to insert some language
on a work plan that pledged to discuss these topics in more detail, having once established the product
list. During the last negotiating round, parties failed to reach agreement on the latter. The current US
administration has yet to take a position on the EGA, while China is holding on to ‘unrealistic demands’,
according to EU officials.33
3.2. A liberal environmental approach
The brief reconstruction of the EGA negotiations allows us to demonstrate how negotiators have
worked from a liberal environmentalism perspective from the very beginning, and how this paradigm has
guided the further evolution of the talks. In the Doha Declaration, the WTO parties agreed to try to put the
trade regime at the service of global environmental objectives through ‘the reduction or, as appropriate,
elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services’.34 This shows that the
drafters of the Doha Development Agenda opted for an approach to the trade–environment nexus that is in
line with free trade. But as we will show, specific choices that have been made during the negotiations also
accord with the liberal environmentalist paradigm. Furthermore, the EU acquiesced in this evolution and
was eventually implicated in the failure of the talks as it held on to economic interests. In the remainder
of this section, we discuss how ‘managed trade’ elements have disappeared from the negotiations, how
explicit technology transfer gave way to market-based distribution of clean technology, and how special
treatment of developing countries gave way to co-responsibility. Our analysis shows how the penetration
of new ideas into the trade domain bumped against the dominant framework of liberal environmentalism,
especially as trade actors were in the driving seat.
3.2.1. Abandoning ‘managed trade’ solutions
As discussed before, a crucial question in the negotiations was how to identify goods and services for
accelerated liberalisation. In the EU’s first draft submission to the WTO, the goal was set to find a common
definition of environmental goods. Although a concrete definition was not formulated, the document
identified guiding principles for the selection of environmental goods. Reference was made to both
developmental (Millennium Development Goals, MDGs) and environmental (Multilateral Environmental
Agreements, MEAs) objectives, and sustainable modes of production and consumption. In 2005 the EU
proposed to select environmental goods based on a life-cycle assessment and environmental labelling.
These trade-conditioning elements were cited as ‘basic parameters in the approach’.35 Shortly afterwards,
however, the Commission reframed its approach in looser terms: ‘Whereas the impacts of production
should be taken into account when selecting products as environmental goods, it is not our intention to
rely exclusively on these parameters to describe them.’36
However, this track was subsequently quickly abandoned as trade actors took control. DG Trade
framed a life-cycle assessment on the EGA product list as an unfeasible endeavour. However, a relatively
33Interview DG Trade, Brussels 16 December 2016.
34Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration 2001, paragraph 31(iii), WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001.
35European Commission, DG Trade, ‘Civil Society Dialogue, Ad hoc Meeting, Summary report DDA: ENVIRONMENTAL
GOODS’, 2 February 2005.
36WTO Committee on Trade and Environment special session, ‘Market access for environmental goods. Communication from
the European Communities’, 17 February 2005.
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small NGO (the Brussels-based organisation ‘Transport and Environment’) did manage to assess the
life-cycle impacts of the EGA product lists.37 Moreover, DG Environment has indicated that a pilot on
environmental footprinting38 could address the issue of life-cycle impacts in the absence of a definition
of green goods to ensure their environmental credibility, but to no avail so far.39 We see that within
the EU, the trade policy subsystem (the collective of actors active in the trade policy domain) is more
sceptical vis-à-vis approaches to marrying environmental and trade objectives when they have the effect
of restricting, conditioning or managing trade. Also outside the EU, several WTO Member States took a
stance against environmental conditionality in the EGA negotiations. Trade liberalisation was subsequently
framed as the ‘win-win-win’ solution for trade, development and the environment. Negotiations on how
to compose a list of goods for accelerated liberalisation proceeded in a mercantilist dynamic familiar to
the trade policy subsystem.
3.2.2. Technology transfer left to market mechanisms
Indeed, over time, negotiators also turned their backs on earlier commitments to include specific
provisions in a trade and environment agreement to ensure that this will particularly benefit developing
countries, arguing that market dynamics will guarantee that liberalising environmental goods is
automatically in their interest. In the beginning, it was stressed that the selection of products should benefit
both industrialised and developing countries and that these should be complemented by explicit technology
transfer commitments. Later, the argument was made that developing countries will benefit from
EGA as the market will ‘transfer’ technology automatically by making environmentally friendly goods
cheaper. This interpretation of technology transfer differs from earlier calls of developing countries in the
multilateral process, stating that they were net importers of environmental goods and that the negotiations
should address their objectives by improving technology transfer and supporting the competitiveness of
their domestic industries. The need for adequate consideration of technology transfer, technical assistance
and capacity-building was specifically underlined by India, stating that a project approach had multiple
advantages over the list approach, including in addressing those issues. The proposal also linked financial
aid and licensing restrictions to the projects. This coincides more with the norm complex of environmental
protection as coined by Bernstein (see above), as it requires substantial transfers of technology and
resources to developing countries. It argues that for developing countries liberalisation is not enough and
should be linked to other channels such as investment, licensing of intellectual property rights, government
procurement, MEAs and development cooperation.40 The recent approach taken in the EGA negotiations,
however, coincides with the paradigm of liberal environmentalism, in which transfers are left primarily to
market mechanisms. The logic is that EGA would boost production opportunities for developing countries
(by attracting foreign companies). Whereas in the beginning it was also recognised that the product lists
should contain sufficient products in which developing countries already have a comparative advantage
(for example organic agricultural products, fibres and dyes) now the ‘trickle-down effect’ of a market
approach is accentuated.
The EU’s position on the use of interventionist policies to stimulate the uptake of environmental
goods such as Local Content Requirements (LCRs) is another example of the consistency with liberal
environmentalist norms that might hamper the development of domestic environmental goods industries
in developing countries. LCRs are laws, regulations or governmental measures that condition support on
the use of a certain percentage of local inputs. They are often justified on the basis of supporting local
37Transport & Environment, ‘Briefing: Environmental Goods Agreement’ (16 September 2015) https://www.
transportenvironment.org/sites/te/files/publications/2015%2009%20TE_EGA%20briefing%20note_FINAL.PDF, accessed 4
February 2019.
38The pilot project has been concluded and the Commission is still evaluating how the environmental footprinting
methodologies can be applied to existing and future policies. No specific decision was taken on introducing a life-cycle
assessment on the product list of the EGA. Interview, DG Environment official.
39European Commission, DG Environment, ‘EGA Stakeholders Event Promoting EU Environmental Objectives Through
Trade’, 3 June 2015.
40Alexey Vikhlyaev, ‘Environmental Goods and Services: Defining Negotiations or Negotiating Definitions’ (2004) 38 Journal
of World Trade 116.
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employment, private sector development and the protection of infant industry. Governments may want
to put these sorts of policies in place as they can be politically important to create coalitions for climate
policy, through green job creation and production opportunities.41 This type of local prioritisation can
be a violation of national treatment principles because it discriminates against foreign products42 and
has triggered several trade disputes, particularly in the field of renewable energy industries. The EU and
several other countries have already taken action against these kinds of measures, for example in the
case of Ontario’s feed-in programme and India’s Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission. Nonetheless,
LCRs have been utilised extensively by China, India, Brazil and South Africa (the ‘BICS’), and also
by EU Member States (Italy and Spain) and individual US states.43 The European Commission has
aimed to address LCRs through EGA and considers this a priority among non-tariff barriers to trade that
work against free trade in green goods. The EU’s list of non-tariff barriers to be addressed also features
government procurement rules and subsidies.
We can conclude that in the process of narrowing down the EGA agenda, explicit technology transfer
has disappeared from the negotiating table. Instead, it is assumed that trade liberalisation in itself will
lead to the distribution of environmentally friendly technologies to developing countries. The take-up of
green technology is not the only responsibility that has shifted towards the side of developing countries
throughout the negotiations.
3.2.3. Responsibility of developing countries
The position of developing countries has been relegated in general in the course of the negotiations,
in addition to the specific issue of technology transfer discussed above. At the beginning of the Doha
Round, the interests of developing countries were placed, at least rhetorically, at centre stage, as the name
Doha Development Round demonstrates. However, after multilateral efforts to reach an agreement as part
of a comprehensive Doha package were abandoned in 2014, very few developing countries have been
involved in the plurilateral EGA negotiations.44
Not only are they thereby sidelined in the discussion on an EGA and is it hence less likely that
their concerns will be integrated in an eventual deal; it has also been foreseen that a sufficient share of
developing countries will have to participate in liberalisation commitments themselves to be able to profit
from any deal. A so-called ‘critical mass threshold’ stipulates that WTO Member States representing at
least 90 per cent of world trade in environmental goods should participate in the agreement before the
concessions agreed are extended to non-participating countries on an MFN basis. In practice, this compels
larger developing countries such as China and India to make concessions themselves in the EGA deal.
3.2.4. The marginalisation of non-trade actors and ideas
The EGA format has brought new actors and ideas into the trade policy arena. The question remains
whether this has substantially altered the dynamics of these negotiations in comparison to ‘traditional’
commercial trade talks? In the case of the EU, DG Trade has assumed the lead in the EGA file. Official
environmental actors, such as DG Environment and DG Climate, have been formally included in the
policy process yet their role has been limited to an advisory function, mainly through consultations
organised by DG Trade in preparation for negotiating rounds. In some instances DG Environment has
been part of the EGA negotiating team yet their role was not proactive and was limited to reacting to
products on lists that could be environmentally harmful. In general, they offer technical expertise and only
‘intervene on the political level when things are heading in the wrong direction’.45 Overall, cooperation
41Timothy Meyer, ‘How Local Discrimination Can Promote Global Public Goods’ (2015) 95 Boston University Law
Review 1937.
42Kevin Gallagher, ‘Trade in the Balance: Reconciling Trade and Climate Policy: Report of the Working Group on Trade,
Investment, and Climate Policy’ (2016) 9–10.
43John A Mathews, ‘Trade Policy, Climate Change and the Greening of Business’ (2015) 69 Australian Journal of International
Affairs 610.
44Mark Wu, ‘Why Developing Countries Won’t Negotiate: The Case of the WTO Environmental Goods Agreement’ (2014) 6
Trade, Law and Development 93.
45Interview DG Environment, Brussels 2 December 2016.
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between DG Trade and DG Environment has not resulted in policy controversies as both appear to operate
in the same ideational framework that places economic norms at centre stage. The win-win approach,
embedded in a green growth strategy that is shared by all DGs involved, has been said to effectively
prevent intra-institutional conflict. Commercial sensitivities have not led to tensions as other DGs did
not question ‘the need to take into consideration how the selection of goods affects the economy’.46
For example, not including bicycles on the product list was not opposed by DG Environment as there
is a general consensus that it is not only environmental impacts that are important. In relation to the
environmental footprinting pilot, DG Environment has also indicated that both for them and DG Trade,
the most important concern is that measures have no trade-restrictive effects.47 Hence, the lead role of DG
Trade has been important, but the liberal environmentalism paradigm is prevalent in other DGs as well.
Other actors, such as environmental NGOs, have found it difficult to penetrate these negotiations.
Overall, EGA has received little attention as it was not considered a priority among green NGOs. It is
considered as both a highly technical file and ‘a drop in the ocean’ in terms of possible meaningful
environmental outcomes.48 In terms of access, Transport & Environment criticised the fact that ‘negotiators
have invited several industry representatives to discuss the list of environmental products, however
non-industry experts have not been afforded such privilege’.49 This criticism of trade negotiation dynamics
that follow the business-as-usual scenario was channelled in demands for an independent assessment
board to ensure the environmental credibility of the EGA product list.50
4. Conclusions
Trade politics has been changing in recent decades with the increasing importance of non-tariff
measures. Trade politics has both ‘deepened’, with new areas beyond tariffs and quota coming into the
purview of liberalisation, and widened, with issues external to the commercial sphere being put on the
trade agenda. The EU has been an important actor in this ‘trade and . . . ’ sphere. In this article, we have
discussed the evolution of one particular initiative in this area, the EGA, with a particular focus on the
role of the EU.
Debates about how the global economy could help support environmental protection have a long
history. In this article we have discussed how paradigms on the interplay between economy, ecology
and development have shifted. From a norm complex that saw interventions in the market as sometimes
inevitable, and environmentally friendly growth of developing countries as requiring assistance and
explicit technology transfer from the North, the dominant paradigm shifted to a neoliberal interpretation of
‘sustainable development’, or ‘liberal environmentalism’. Here, growth and environmental protection were
seen as not only reconcilable, but even synergetic. Environmental protection was considered as a common
responsibility of North and South; both would have to ensure that the market mechanism was able to
spread technological innovation, raise income growth, and in its wake raise the level of environmental
protection worldwide.
Empirically, we have shown how the negotiations on an EGA conform to the dominant liberal
environmentalism paradigm. The choice in the WTO Ministerial Declaration of 2001 to pursue the
environmental contribution of the Doha Development Round by eliminating trade barriers to goods
and services, rather than alternative avenues (such as eliminating fossil fuel subsidies or introducing an
‘environmental clause’ in the WTO) in itself is in line with liberal environmentalism’s emphasis on free
markets. On top of this, the evolution of the EGA negotiations corresponds to liberal environmentalism’s
core characteristics. One of the main issues in the negotiations has been how to decide on which goods
(and services) should qualify for accelerated liberalisation. While a criteria-based approach, especially if
it took into account life-cycle analyses of the climate impact of products, would have been more in line
with the environmental objectives of the talks, it could mean that some products from some countries
46Interview DG Environment, Brussels 26 October 2017.
47The pilot – if applied in future policies – will result in a voluntary initiative aiming to facilitate trade in environmentally
credible goods. Interview DG Environment, Brussels 2 December 2016.
48Interview Transport & Environment, Brussels 16 November 2016.
49Interview Transport & Environment, Brussels 16 November 2016.
50Transport & Environment, ‘Briefing: Environmental Goods Agreement’ (2015).
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would be qualified as less- or non-environmentally friendly. Trade liberalisation would hence be organised
in an explicitly conditional way. This could become a basis for PPMs-based trade measures in the future.
Instead, negotiators decided to opt for the traditional methodology for trade liberalisation within the
world trade system, whereby participating states would, through a demand-and-offer approach, agree on a
product list of environmental goods. Thereby, only the end-use environmental impact would be considered.
We have shown that the trade policy subsystem is more sceptical vis-à-vis combining environmental and
trade objectives when they have the effect of restricting, conditioning or managing trade. The eventual
breakdown of the talks shows unsurprisingly that commercial considerations have played a decisive role.
Besides the focus on trade barrier elimination and the approach to decide on how goods would be
selected as ‘environmentally friendly’, the handling of technology transfer and developing countries more
generally has been in line with liberal environmentalism as well. While developing countries asked for
explicit financial assistance and technology transfer (for example by easing intellectual property rights),
this theme disappeared from the negotiating table as it was assumed that trade liberalisation as such would
guarantee technology transfer.
We have argued that the first explicit negotiations to put international trade policies at the service of
climate protection have evolved increasingly in a ‘trade first’ direction. It seems that by holding these
negotiations in a trade forum – the WTO – a commercial logic was always likely to predominate as
this puts trade actors in the driving seat. This has been helped by the documented proliferation of a
‘liberal environmentalism’ paradigm on the desired reconciliation of environmental and economic policies.
In this policy subsystem and under this dominant paradigm, we also found that it has been difficult for
environmental NGOs to penetrate these negotiations. Finally, an interesting lesson to be drawn is that
trying to reconcile trade and environmental objectives in a synergetic (‘win-win-win’) manner does not
make a successful conclusion necessarily easier. When trade negotiators and a commercial rationale rule
supreme, narrow-minded commercial interests can still preclude a consensus. In the EGA negotiations,
we witnessed indeed how talks evolved in a ‘least common denominator’ direction, only to eventually fail
over which products to liberalise.
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